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Introduction 
From March to October 2016 recurring attempts were made at blocking access to the 
official website of the organisation Black Lives Matter.1 An Anonymous-affiliated 
team calling itself ‘Ghost Squad’ took responsibility for some of them, causing 
confusion on the part of commentators.2 For many, it was unclear how to reconcile 
the thrust of these attacks with the political orientation of earlier actions of 
Anonymous such as campaigns against Scientology and in support of Julian Assange. 
Ghost Squad, specifically, had earlier targeted the website of the Ku Klux Klan. Yet in 
a video posted on May 2 on a YouTube channel called @anonymous_exposes_racism, 
the group explained that they had “seen people in your movement on the streets and 
social media chanting and posting slogans such as ‘Kill Whitey,’ ’Death to the slave 
masters’ and other objectionable statements,” and had, therefore, decided to take 
action: “We will not tolerate racist behaviour and hate speech from your movement 
or any other organization any more than we do from the KKK.”3 Earlier, an account 
called, “_s1iege” had tweeted screenshots of an ongoing Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attack along with the hashtag #OPAllLivesMatter.4 
These events in 2016 raise many complex questions relating to the nature of 
online activism and to the specific circumstances of the fight for racial justice in the 
US.5 While the full scope of these questions cannot be covered here, the attacks against 
Black Lives Matter provide an exemplary point of entry for thinking about changes in 
DDoS attacks as a political tactic. Blocking access to websites of political opponents 
 
1 Corin Faife, “The DDoS Vigilantes Trying to Silence Black Lives Matter”, Ars Technica, December 14, 
2016, https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/12/hack_attacks_on_black_ 
lives_matter/. 
2 Catalin Cimpanu, “Anonymous Ghost Squad Hackers Take Down Black Lives Matter Website”, 
Softpedia, May 1, 2016, https://news.softpedia.com/news/anonymous-ghost-squad-hackers-take-
down-black-lives-matter-website-503579.shtml. 
3 anonymous exposes racism, “Anonymous Calls out #BlackLivesMatter for Anti-White Racism,” 
YouTube Video, 3:01. May 3, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDXsInz9jz8. 
4 Anonymous (@_s1ege), “#OpAllLivesMatter #GhostSquadHackers blacklivesmatter.com #Defaced 
and #Ddos’d ~s1ege” Twitter, April 30, 2016, https://twitter.com/_s1ege/status 
/726206708473847809. 
5 For investigations of these aspects, see Amber M. Hamilton, ‘A Genealogy of Critical Race and Digital 
Studies: Past, Present, and Future’, Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 6, no. 3 (2020): 292-301; Sarah J. 
Jackson, Moya Bailey, and Brooke Foucault Welles, #HashtagActivism: Networks of Race and Gender 
Justice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2020); Marcia Mundt, Karen Ross, and Charla M Burnett, 
‘Scaling Social Movements Through Social Media: The Case of Black Lives Matter’, Social Media + 
Society 4, no. 4 (2018), doi.org/10.1177/2056305118807911. 
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by means of DDoS attacks has long been considered a key tactic of online activism.6 
It represents a specific kind of induced crisis of communication that causes disruption 
in the flow of communication, thereby providing an opportunity to focus attention 
on certain issues.7 However, as the example of Ghost Squad demonstrates, it is also a 
polyvalent tactic in the sense that the political (or commercial, criminal or plain 
malevolent) purposes affiliated with it can diverge widely and are prone to sudden 
shifts of political orientation. 
One development that is especially apparent when considering the events in 
2016 is that DDoS attacks have become a more enduring phenomenon. From early 
campaigns, which in many ways resembled traditional forms of political activism, 
involving a multitude of engaged people causing temporary disruptions that lasted for 
some hours or days, DDoS has turned into sustained cascades of highly automated 
attacks that can last for several months. 
The aim of this paper is to spell out the consequences of this shift from DDoS 
as short-lived events to enduring phenomenon. The core argument is that this shift of 
temporality has repercussions on the distributional layers of internet infrastructure 
that have escaped the attention of existing scholarship on DDoS as an activist tactic. 
This point will be developed through three steps. First, the paper provides a technical 
overview of developments in the DDoS landscape. Secondly, this overview is related 
to established positions and periodisations in DDoS research. Thirdly, the discussion 
extends towards infrastructure studies in order to focus on the relationship between 
breakdown and visibility. The paper concludes by calling for a stronger engagement 
with the temporal aspects of recurring communication crises in general and DDoS 
attacks in particular. 
 
DDoS – Technical Developments 
A DDoS attack seeks to exhaust the capacity of a web server by overwhelming it with 
requests, thus rendering content inaccessible. Under normal working conditions, a 
request to a server, initiated by a user, prompts that server to send the requested data. 
During a successful DDoS attack, a server is unable to distinguish between legitimate 
requests by regular users and requests that are sent with the purpose of bringing the 
server down. In trying to fulfil all requests, the server and/or the network eventually 
meet capacity limits, which means that legitimate requests receive error responses. 
 
6 Molly Sauter, The Coming Swarm. DDoS Actions, Hacktivism, and Civil Disobedience on the Internet (New 
York; London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014). 
7 Tim Jordan and Paul Taylor, Hacktivism and Cyberwars: Rebels with a Cause? (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 75-82. 
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Usually, DDoS attacks do not affect the data that is stored on a server, but rather 
make it temporarily inaccessible. Yet, depending on the scale of the attack, it can take 
a considerable amount of time and resources to restore the functionality of the system. 
Denial of Service has a long legacy as a technique for disturbing online 
communication and a wide range of different strategies have been developed and 
implemented.8 Many of these approaches are well known in the field of computer 
science and there is an equally active development of counter-strategies for defending 
servers and networks against them.9 A key factor in these strategies is the ability to 
identify patterns in DDoS attack traffic, since such patterns can be used as the basis 
for developing filtering and blocking rules, as well as more flexible traffic management 
mechanisms based on Machine Learning.10 At the same time, there is a constant search 
for vulnerabilities in online systems that can be exploited for expanding DDoS 
capabilities. The proliferation of connected devices commonly referred to as the 
Internet of Things is especially prone to such exploitation, since these devices often 
lack adequate security features.11  
The simplest versions of DDoS that rely on sending large numbers of identical 
requests, so-called volumetric attacks, often produce easily identifiable traffic 
patterns, which is why most websites today are effectively defended against them. 
More advanced versions of DDoS rely on application layer attacks. These are based on 
a strategy where requests are sent in ways that mimic the behaviour of regular users, 
making it difficult to identify and filter out attack traffic. Two popular kinds of 
application layer attacks are HTTP flood and reflection attacks. An HTTP flood can 
be initiated by different kinds of software, from simple scripts to more elaborate and 
established techniques, where requests for large amounts of data are sent at longer 
intervals. Some of these techniques are comparatively easy to defend against, since 
they involve identifiable combinations of IP addresses and user agents that can be 
blocked. Also, many systems serve cached versions of frequently requested files, which 
reduces the load on servers and, thus, protects them against simple HTTP floods – 
 
8 Laura DeNardis, “A History of Internet Security”, in The History of Information Security: A 
Comprehensive Handbook, ed. Karl de Leeuw and Jan Bergstra (Amsterdam, London: Elsevier, 2007), 
681-704. 
9 Sajal Bhatia, Sunny Behal, and Irfan Ahmed, “Distributed Denial of Service Attacks and Defense 
Mechanisms: Current Landscape and Future Directions”, in Versatile Cybersecurity, ed. Mauro Conti, 
Gaurav Somani, and Radha Poovendran (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2018), 55-97. 
10 Kian Son Hoon et al., “Critical Review of Machine Learning Approaches to Apply Big Data Analytics 
in DDoS Forensics”, in 2018 International Conference on Computer Communication and Informatics 
(ICCCI), 2018, 1-5. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCCI.2018.8441286. 
11 Constantinos Kolias et al., “DDoS in the IoT: Mirai and Other Botnets”, Computer 50, no. 7 (2017): 80-
84. 
Röhle / DDoS: From Activist Event to Perpetual Crisis
communication+1 Vol. 8 [2021], Iss. 1, Article 5
3
which again has triggered the development of counterstrategies on the part of 
attackers. 
Reflection attacks rely on exploiting specific vulnerabilities of systems in 
order to prompt them to send requests to a target server. Even more advantageous for 
an attacker are systems that not only reflect, but also amplify traffic, i.e. that send 
(sometimes considerably) larger amounts of traffic to the target than the attacker sent 
to the system, thus amplifying bandwidth resources.12 Beyond the exploitation of such 
functionalities and vulnerabilities, the spread of malware allows attackers to take 
complete control over a system, and then instruct them to send requests to a target 
server or a reflection server. Compromised devices can be gathered into botnets, 
which receive their instructions from command and control servers. The challenge for 
the bot herder is then to distribute malware as efficiently as possible, to establish 
reliant and secure communication to the command and control server, to secure the 
botnet against being taken over by others and to make it difficult to track down the 
command and control server that issues instructions.13 
The example of the DDoS attack against Black Lives Matter illustrates how 
these developments play out in practice. As a detailed technical investigation shows,14 
botnet commands in this case could be traced back to servers that were rented 
temporarily from Digital Ocean, a company offering Virtual Private Services and 
hosted by DMZHOST, a hosting company that keeps the identity of its clients secret. 
Yet, even if it were possible to identify the clients of these companies, it is not unlikely 
that they would turn out to be a commercial entity offering DDoS as a service. These 
services are marketed openly on the web, thinly disguised as “booters” or “stressers” 
that website owners can use to test the resilience of their systems.15 
 
12 Kulvinder Singh and Ajit Singh, “Memcached DDoS Exploits: Operations, Vulnerabilities, 
Preventions and Mitigations”, in 2018 IEEE 3rd International Conference on Computing, Communication 
and Security (ICCCS), 2018, 171-79, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/ 
8586810. 
13 Pascal Geenens, “IoT Botnets. The Journey So Far and the Road Ahead”, in Botnets: Architectures, 
Countermeasures, and Challenges, ed. Georgios Kambourakis et al. (New York: CRC Press, 2020), 33-
100. 
14 Seamus Tuohy, “Botnet Attack Analysis of Deflect Protected Website Blacklivesmatter.com”, 
eQualitie, December 14, 2016, https://equalit.ie/en/deflect-labs-report-3-3d/. 
15 Santanna, José Jair, “DDoS-as-a-Service: Investigating Booter Websites” (PhD diss., University of 
Twente, 2017), https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/ddos-as-a-service-investigating-booter-
websites. 
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From this – very rough – sketch of developments in the DDoS landscape, three 
aspects can be singled out as especially pertinent when it comes to DDoS as a political 
tactic: 
 
1. Complexity of motives 
The use of reflection tactics, botnets, command and control servers, virtual private 
services, etc., increases the distance between the attacker and the target, rendering the 
attribution of attacks ever more difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, performing a 
DDoS attack involves very little risk of being exposed. However, the different layers 
of the attack infrastructure are also characterised by a functional differentiation 
which can be tied to different motives of the involved actors. Some parts, such as 
commercial booter services or virtual private services, can be primarily driven by 
financial gain, whereas other parts, such as malware development, can be primarily 
fuelled by reputation in hacker circles; others still can be based on political motives, 
both grass-root activist or state-sponsored.16 The current DDoS landscape is thus 
characterised by a growing complexity of interlinked motives on different levels of 
the attack infrastructure. 
 
2. Automation and consolidation 
The use of botnets represents one aspects of a tendency to automate and consolidate 
DDoS attack capabilities. Both the identification of vulnerable devices and their 
recruitment into botnets are processes that are increasingly automated, minimising 
the manual effort involved in being a bot herder. Increasing automation implies that 
the administration of these services is becoming less laborious and that there is 
increased competition between different providers, driving prices down. The 
resulting availability of pre-packaged attack capabilities as a service means that it 
requires neither technical expertise nor established contacts nor substantial funds to 
launch attacks against political opponents. In the words of the technical report on the 
attacks against Black Lives Matter: “Silencing online voices is becoming ever easier 
and cheaper on the Internet.”17 
 
16 Some authors seek to identify causal historical trajectories from hacktivism to other forms of DDoS, 
e.g., Tracey Caldwell, “Hacktivism Goes Hardcore”, Network Security 2015, no. 5 (1 May 2015): 12-17. 
The argument here does not follow this line of reasoning, but rather focuses on the intermingling of 
different motives on different functional layers. 
17 Tuohy, “Botnet Attack Analysis of Deflect Protected Website Blacklivesmatter.com”. 
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3. Reliance on professional protection 
With the web becoming an increasingly hostile environment, there is a constant risk 
that attempts will be made at blocking access to the online presence of activist 
organisations whenever content or actions are perceived as controversial by others.18 
Without professional protection, even simpler attacks have the potential of blocking 
access to content. This means that activist organisations have to take the possibility 
of attacks into account and prepare accordingly by soliciting protection from 
professional providers of IT security. However, relying on these services also means 
being at the mercy of a provider’s internal policies and business objectives.19 
Taken together, these three developments suggest an ongoing qualitative shift 
of DDoS from exceptional disruptions that can work in favour of activists’ political 
purposes to a situation where DDoS becomes part of the infrastructural conditions of 
online activism. This shift raises crucial questions about power relations in the digital 
realm: Under what circumstances can DDoS be perceived as a tactic for activists to 
unbalance prevailing asymmetries of power and under which circumstances does it 




Phases of Hacktivism 
Political DDoS attacks (or DDoS actions as Sauter prefers to call them20), especially 
those performed by Anonymous, are usually considered as part of a broader history 
of hacktivism. In a recent overview over hacktivism research, Romagna offers a precise 
 
18 For an early empirical investigation from this perspective, see Ethan Zuckerman et al., “Distributed 
Denial of Service Attacks Against Independent Media and Human Rights Sites” (The Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, December 2010), 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.harvard.edu/files/2010_DDoS_Attacks_Human_Rights_and_
Media.pdf, 10. 
19 A case that has been the subject of substantial debate, both in technical and legal circles, was 
Cloudflare’s decision to terminate its services for the neo-nazi site, “The Daily Stormer,” in 2017, see 
Steven Johnson, “Inside Cloudflare’s Decision to Let an Extremist Stronghold Burn”, Wired, 16 
January, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/free-speech-issue-cloudflare/; Kate Klonick, “The 
Terrifying Power of Internet Censors”, The New York Times, 13 September, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/opinion/cloudflare-daily-stormer-charlottesville.html. 
20 Sauter, The Coming Swarm. 
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definition of the term as well as a synthesis of periodisations suggested in various 
historical accounts. Incorporating previous definitions,21 he defines hacktivism as, 
the sum of ideologies, individual and collective actions typical of 
traditional activism, applied in cyberspace using hacking techniques, 
while addressing or exploiting network infrastructure’s technical and 
ontological features, with the final goal of reaching a sociopolitical 
change in society.22 
According to Romagna, hacktivism can be placed in between cyberattacks that have 
permanently destructive consequences and less invasive forms of cyberactivism that 
primarily rely on disseminating information. Hacktivism involves actual hacking 
practices, yet with a merely temporary disruptive impact. 
Romagna suggests a distinction between three different phases of hacktivism 
based on changes in normative, organisational and technological aspects. The first 
phase (from late 1980s to early 2000s) is characterised by the expansion of hacking 
practices from the specific concerns of the hacking community itself to wider political 
issues. A prominent example indicating this development is Floodnet: a DDoS 
software developed by the Electronic Disturbance Theater in 1998 in order to raise 
attention for the cause of the Zapatistas in Mexico. As Sauter points out in a more 
detailed analysis of these developments, the extension of hacking practices into more 
broad-ranging politics did not come without frictions; for example, when silencing 
political opponents clashed with ideals of a “free flow of information” that was 
considered central to hacker culture.23 Karatzogianni highlights the central role of 
hacktivism in different “ethnoreligious struggles” with patriotic or nationalist agendas 
during this phase.24 
The second phase, from 2003 onwards, is characterised by the rise of 
Anonymous. While Anonymous remains an amorphous organisational formation that 
 
21 Stefania Milan, “Hacktivism as a Radical Media Practice”, in The Routledge Companion to Alternative 
and Community Media, ed. Chris Atton (New York: Routledge, 2015), 550-60; Dorothy E. Denning, 
“Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy”, 
in Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, ed. John Arquilla and David F. 
Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 239-88. 
22 Marco Romagna, “Evolution of Hacktivism: From Origins to Now”, in From Sit-Ins to #revolutions: 
Media and the Changing Nature of Protests, ed. Olivia Guntarik and Victoria Grieve-Williams (New 
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 65-76, 65. 
23  Sauter, The Coming Swarm, 47. 
24 Athina Karatzogianni, Firebrand Waves of Digital Activism 1994-2014 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015). 
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is difficult to categorise25, Romagna sees its growing importance during this phase as 
a sign of consolidation. The organisational form of hacktivism shifts from smaller, 
clandestine hacker groups to a larger collective that resembles social movements and 
with successful strategies for gaining media attention.26 However, the “patriotic” 
strand of hacktivism also remains relevant in this phase, with the targeting of Estonian 
websites in 2007 as a prominent example. The planned transfer of a Russian 
monument triggered a surge of DDoS attacks against Estonian publications, banks 
and government websites.27 The case highlighted the vulnerability of internet 
infrastructure, eventually leading to the establishment of the NATO Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn.28 It is also an example of DDoS attacks 
where it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between “grass-roots” 
hacktivism and state-sponsored attacks. 
The third phase is characterised by diversification. What sets this phase apart 
from the second, according to Romagna, is that it becomes less of a priority to involve 
average internet users. Whereas hacktivism software during the second phase was 
often designed to lower the threshold for participation, the third phase is 
characterised by small expert teams, some of them with loose affiliation to 
Anonymous, cooperating in varying constellations. In terms of values, there is a 
tendency towards particular forms of “vigilante justice”29 against particular targets, 
rather than concerted efforts to align with broader sociopolitical agendas.30 Again, the 
patriotic strand of hacktivism prevails in this phase, often in reaction to specific 
geopolitical tensions or conflicts. 
 
Phases of DDoS: Technological developments 
While shifts in values and organisational forms are key factors in describing the 
historical development of hacktivism more broadly, Desiriis suggests that 
 
25 E. Gabriella Coleman, Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous (London, New 
York: Verso, 2014); Carolin Wiedemann, “Between Swarm, Network, and Multitude: Anonymous 
and the Infrastructures of the Common”, Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory 15, no. 3 (2 September 
2014): 309-26. 
26 Romagna, “Evolution of Hacktivism: From Origins to Now”, 72. 
27 Finn Brunton, Spam: A Shadow History of the Internet, Infrastructures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
MIT Press, 2013), 188-190. 
28 Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School”, 
International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 4 (2009): 1155-75. 
29 Romagna, ”Evolution of Hacktivism: From Origins to Now”, 75. 
30 In this sense, the DDoS attack against Black Lives Matter mentioned in the beginning fits this 
description well. 
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technological developments are central to identifying different phases in the 
development of DDoS specifically.31 
Some of the first political DDoS attacks, such as the “netstrike” against Strano 
in 199532 and the “Deportation Class” action against Lufthansa in 2001,33 relied on users 
who manually and repeatedly sent requests to the targeted server by reloading a 
website. As Sauter shows, this first phase was quickly superseded by methods where 
the sending of requests was automatically performed by software such as the Floodnet 
software used in the Zapatista campaigns.34 Many DDoS actions performed by 
Anonymous involved a software called the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) that, once 
installed on a user’s computer, could be instructed to send large amounts of requests 
to a target server.35 
The third phase in Desiriis’ periodisation of the technological development of 
DDoS is characterised by the increasing involvement of botnets. The most prominent 
example for this phase is a malware called Mirai, which succeeded in infecting huge 
numbers of low-end Internet of Things devices, such as security cameras, video 
recorders and routers, in 2016.36 This botnet resulted in some of the largest DDoS 
attacks to date, including an attack on DynDNS that caused major websites including 
Twitter, The New York Times, Reddit and Netflix to become inaccessible for several 
hours at a time. Within the course of a few months, similar attacks based on Mirai 
botnets were launched against telecommunication companies and media 
organisations, as well as blogs of individual journalists.37 
Functionally, there are similarities between sending requests in an automated 
way via software like the LOIC and a botnet like the one assembled by Mirai. In each 
case, a network of computing devices is made to adhere to instructions that are issued 
from a specific location (a command and control server in the case of botnets, an IRC 
chat channel controlled by Anonymous in the case of LOIC), which makes it possible 
 
31 Marco Deseriis, “Hacktivism: On the Use of Botnets in Cyberattacks”, Theory, Culture & Society 34, 
no. 4 (July 2017): 131-52. 
32 Sauter, The Coming Swarm, 50. 
33 Sauter, The Coming Swarm, 53-54; Ricardo Dominguez, “Electronic Civil Disobedience Post-9/11”, 
Third Text 22, no. 5 (2008): 661-70, 662-667. 
34 Sauter, The Coming Swarm, 109-113. 
35 Coleman, Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy, 133-140; Sauter, The Coming Swarm, 113-133. 
36 Garrett M. Graff, “How a Dorm Room Minecraft Scam Brought Down the Internet”, Wired, 
December 13, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/mirai-botnet-minecraft-scam-brought-down-the-
internet/. 
37 Robinson Meyer and Adrienne LaFrance, “When the Entire Internet Seems to Break at Once”, The 
Atlantic, October 21, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/ 
10/when-the-entire-internet-seems-to-break-at-once/504956/. 
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to synchronise these devices’ resources in order to target a server and overwhelm its 
capacities. However, while the LOIC, to varying degrees, relied on the voluntary 
contribution of bandwidth and computing power of those using the software, botnets 
consist of devices that are used for these purposes without the consent of their owners. 
 
Effectivity and Legitimacy of DDoS 
There is no doubt that the growing use of non-voluntary botnets does make a 
significant difference in terms of the effectivity of DDoS attacks. Due to 
improvements in web security, it is questionable whether highly publicised events 
such as Anonymous’ Operation Payback in 2010 would have had any noticeable effect 
without their involvement.38 However, there is an ongoing debate whether it also 
makes a difference in terms of legitimacy whether users have clearly signalled their 
consent to the use of their equipment (as in the case of the LOIC) or whether it is 
used in a non-voluntary way, after being infected by malware. Sauter points out that 
the question of whether to automate server requests was already prevalent during the 
first phase of DDoS actions and that some technical possibilities were actively 
disregarded in order to “maintain a one-to-one participant to signal ratio.”39 
For many scholars involved in hacktivism research, the legitimacy of DDoS 
hinges on the question of whether it should be considered a form of civil disobedience. 
Delmas is sceptical about including any form of hacktivism in this category since it 
would lower the level of commitment that she considers central to civil disobedience.40 
Sauter, on the other hand, makes an elaborate case for including DDoS under the 
category of civil disobedience by comparing it to offline forms of activism and 
developing a set of criteria for assessing the legitimacy of specific actions. One of these 
criteria concerns the use of non-voluntary botnets, which they regard as “a grossly 
unethical action”41 that impacts negatively on legitimate forms of activism. Celikates 
and de Zeeuw make the opposite case, arguing that non-voluntary botnets should be 
considered as legitimate forms of civil disobedience, since they reflect a 
 
38 Candice Delmas, “Is Hacktivism the New Civil Disobedience?”, Raisons Politiques, no. 1 (2018): 63-81, 
70; Deseriis, “Hacktivism”, 144; Parmy Olson, We Are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker World of Lulzsec, 
Anonymous, and the Global Cyber Insurgency (New York: Little, Brown and Co, 2012), 117. 
39 Sauter, The Coming Swarm, 44. 
40 Delmas, “Is Hacktivism the New Civil Disobedience?”, 69. 
41 Sauter, The Coming Swarm, 132. 
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transformation of activist strategies towards “algorithmic resistance.”42 Fordyce makes 
a similar case involving a historical-critical reading of the concept of the automaton.43 
Desiriis discusses the use of non-voluntary botnets from an ethical 
perspective, highlighting both the absence of user consent and the problem of 
intransparency when decisions about targets are delegated to a small “techno-elite.”44 
However, rather than engaging in the debate about legitimacy and civil disobedience, 
he primarily treats botnets as a case in order to explore how the hybridity of 
contemporary socio-technical assemblages impacts upon anthropocentric notions of 
political agency. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between signifying 
and a-signifying components, as well as Simondon’s notions of transindividuation, he 
seeks to “grasp the evolution of the hacktivist DDoS from a collective human action 
that uses specialized software tools to achieve specific political ends to a process of 
transindividuation that is activated by unspecialized network resources.”45 From this 
perspective, it appears that the use of non-voluntary botnets for hacktivist purposes 
has “reversed the relationship between collective subjectivation and technological 
efficiency.”46 Rather than establishing a functional relationship between existing 
political struggles and technical means to promote this struggle, technicity itself 
becomes the site of politics. 
 
Breakdown and visibility 
Following Desiriis’ argument, DDoS attacks can, thus, be interpreted as a struggle 
about technicity: 
In this respect, Anonymous may well be the name of an emerging 
koiné, a new lingua franca whereby the machines’ openness to the 
 
42 Robin Celikates and Daniel de Zeeuw, “Botnet Politics, Algorithmic Resistance and Hacking 
Society”, in Hacking Habitat: Art of Control, ed. Ine Gevers (Utrecht: Niet Normaal Foundation, 2016), 
209-17, 217. 
43 Robbie Fordyce, “DDoS Attacks as Political Assemblages”, Platform 5, no. 1 (2013): 6-20. Other versions 
of these arguments are brought forward by Evgeny Morozov, “Pro-WikiLeaks Denial of Service 
Attacks: Just Another Form of Civil Disobedience.”, Slate Magazine, December 13, 2010, 
https://slate.com/technology/2010/12/pro-wikileaks-denial-of-service-attacks-just-another-form-of-
civil-disobedience.html; Cory Doctorow, “We Need a Serious Critique of Net Activism”, The 
Guardian, January 25, 2011, sec. Technology, https://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2011/jan/25/net-activism-delusion. 
44 Deseriis, “Hacktivism”, 145. 
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surrounding milieu meets the human belief that defending such 
openness works in the service of a freer society.47 
This perspective shares many concerns with debates in infrastructure studies that 
focus on the “enabling environments”48 that are taken for granted during times of 
‘normal’ operation. As John Durham Peters states, infrastructure is usually “full of 
inertia,” but at the same time remains “open to sabotage.”49 Moments of crisis or 
breakdown are considered to be privileged vantage points for those studying 
infrastructure, because of their potential to reveal aspects that usually escape 
attention. 
Many contributions in the field refer to the seminal list of characteristics of 
infrastructure developed by Star and Ruhleder, including the assertion that 
infrastructure “becomes visible upon breakdown.”50 If infrastructure has a tendency to 
fade into the background, a key question is what kind of strategies can help in 
rendering it visible – what Bowker and Star have conceptualised as “infrastructural 
inversion.”51 What is special about breakdown in this sense is that it not only allows 
researchers to observe socio-technical constellations in a state of uncertainty and 
negotiability, but also confronts ordinary users, i.e. those relying on the infrastructure 
in question, with the fragility of their enabling environments – “the server is down, 
the bridge washes out, there is a power blackout.”52 While such moments of disruption 
might be experienced as irritating, they are also illuminating. As Jackson puts it, 
“Breakdown disturbs and sets in motion worlds of possibility that disappear under 
the stable or accomplished form of the artifact.”53 
However, the strong association between breakdown and visibility that runs 
through infrastructure research54 has also been subject to qualifications. In a recent 
 
47 Deseriis, “Hacktivism”, 146. 
48 John Durham Peters, The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media (Chicago, London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015), 3. 
49 Peters, The Marvelous Clouds, 31. 
50 Susan Leigh Star and Karen Ruhleder, “Steps Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure: Design and Access 
for Large Information Spaces”, Information Systems Research 7, no. 1 (1996): 111-34, 113. 
51 Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things out. Classification and Its Consequences 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), 34. 
52 Star and Ruhleder, “Steps Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure”, 113. 
53 Steven J. Jackson, “Rethinking Repair”, in Media Technologies. Essays on Communication, Materiality, and 
Society, ed. Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo J. Boczkowski, and Kirsten A. Foot, Inside Technology 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2014), 221-39, 230. 
54 See also Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski, “Introduction”, in Signal Traffic: Critical Studies of Media 
Infrastructures, ed. Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 1-27, 
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contribution to the debate, Seberger and Bowker question the premise that failure is 
an observable quality of an object, because this perspective disregards the role of 
human subjectivity in experiencing the visibility of infrastructure.55 They highlight 
the fact that instances of “hyper-functionality” can be equally disturbing and are, thus, 
revealing from a subjective point of view. By broadening the range of human 
experiences that potentially contribute to the awareness of infrastructure, they seek 
to arrive at an understanding of breakdown that is not tied to “objectival visibility.”56 
A different critique is developed in a seminal paper by Graham and Thrift.57 
Questioning the premise that breakdown appears in the form of extraordinary events, 
they seek to shift focus towards small and everyday instances of failures that they 
consider inherent to infrastructures. By assuming brokenness and decay, rather than 
smooth functionality, as the status quo, they seek to highlight the role of maintenance 
and repair that usually receives little attention. By focusing on the human labour that 
is necessary to keep infrastructures functional, this perspective also helps to grasp the 
profoundly sociotechnical nature of infrastructure, rather than seeing it as primarily 
technical arrangements. Jackson points out how this shift of focus, “draws our 
attention around the sociality of objects forward, into the ongoing forms of labor, 
power, and interest – neither dead nor congealed – that underpin the ongoing survival 
of things as objects in the world.”58 
Both kinds of qualifications – the integration of subjective experience and the 
integration of maintenance and repair – thus seek to broaden the horizon of what can 
be considered as breakdown. They also tie in with a stronger orientation of the field 
towards process and practices reflected in the shift of terminology from 
infrastructures to “infrastructuring.”59 However, scholarly contributions that more 
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explicitly focus on the role of temporality in infrastructure have hitherto mostly been 
confined to the field of anthropology and urban geography.60 
 
DDoS as breakdown 
There is, thus, an emerging debate about the relationship between breakdown and 
visibility within the broader field of infrastructure studies. As a specific kind of 
breakdown of communication infrastructure, DDoS attacks are a relevant 
phenomenon to consider in this regard. Accordingly, similar questions have been 
raised in this field of research, for example by Sauter: 
A direct action DDoS seeks to strip away the attractive, humanized 
facade to reveal a corporate target’s reality as black boxed and 
monolithic, fundamentally unresponsive (metaphorically and 
actually) to human concerns.61 
In this sense, the temporary crisis of communication is ascribed a potential to reveal, 
to open up for scrutiny and to open up for new possibilities. Beck strikes a similar 
chord when discussing the deterritorialising effect of DDoS attacks and pointing out 
how these “changed belief structures, produced new knowledge, spawned physical 
protests, and made local oppressive actions visible globally.”62 Breakdown plays a 
similar role in Desiriis’ argument, which, with a more sociotechnical focus, revolves 
around the “margin of indetermination of machines and living beings.”63 In his 
argument, botnets and Anonymous itself are seen as sociotechnical amalgamations 
that raise the question of indetermination. However, it is the breakdown of 
communication induced by DDoS attacks that represents the inflection point where 
this negotiation of openness becomes visible. 
When confronting these perspectives with the critique developed by Graham 
and Thrift,64 it appears that DDoS research, too, is preoccupied with major failures at 
the expense of mundane acts of maintenance. This is hardly surprising given the 
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canonical cases that are discussed in the literature. Historically, the political use of 
DDoS follows the logic of political campaigning by actively creating temporarily 
disruptive events that trigger public and media attention – as reflected in the name 
“Electronic Disturbance Theater.” As an intentionally created communication crisis 
with a political agenda, it seems that the very essence of DDoS is its exceptionality. 
However, when looking at the recent technological development of DDoS beyond the 
canonical examples, the question of exceptionality becomes more complicated. In the 
following section, the sketch of technical developments provided above will be used 
as a basis for a more elaborate discussion of the relationship between exceptionality 
and visibility. 
 
DDoS becomes ordinary 
As discussed, central aspects that are characteristic for the development of the DDoS 
landscape are the growing complexity of motives and the automation and 
consolidation of DDoS capabilities. These developments have contributed to DDoS 
attacks becoming a persistent, rather than an exceptional phenomenon,65 and have 
resulted in an increasing reliance of activist organisations on professional protection 
services. Whereas the existing scholarship has primarily focused on DDoS as a tactic 
employed by activist organisations, the shift towards DDoS as a persistent 
phenomenon necessitates a stronger focus on how they are subjected to such attacks. 
From being a tool in the hacktivist arsenal – as the periodisations discussed above 
portray it – DDoS has turned into an aspect of the material infrastructural conditions 
of online activism. This calls for a stronger engagement with the systemic 
consequences of DDoS protection requirements and a critical investigation of the 
actors providing such services. 
A productive theoretical approach to guide such an investigation is developed 
by Burkart and McCourt, who focus on the productive or systemic consequences of 
hacking rather than on its exceptional or disruptive qualities.66 A key argument in 
their analysis, based on a political economy perspective, is that hacking creates 
particular kinds of economic risks. Systemically speaking, “the market processes these 
risks by commodifying them.”67 The authors point towards the global increase in 
 
65 Mattijs Jonker et al., “Millions of Targets under Attack: A Macroscopic Characterization of the DoS 
Ecosystem”, in Proceedings of the 2017 Internet Measurement Conference, IMC ’17 (New York, NY, USA: 
Association for Computing Machinery, 2017), 100-113. 
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cybersecurity spending, which indicates a growing market for both cybersecurity tools 
and services and insurance against hacking losses as well as increasing venture capital 
that flows into cybersecurity companies. 
While their analysis focuses on hacking in general, the core argument holds 
for DDoS attacks as well. For companies, the inaccessibility of content due to a DDoS 
attack, even if it is temporary, poses a direct financial risk. For activist or journalistic 
websites, DDoS attacks represent a risk that relevant information is withheld from 
public debate. In both cases, DDoS attacks can also negatively impact on 
organisations’ reputation, economy and public support. Providers of commercial 
DDoS protection seize upon this opportunity, marketing their services towards larger 
corporations that are prepared to invest substantially in IT security. Actors that are 
considered to be leading in this particular field are Akamai, Cloudflare, Imperva and 
Radware.68 The increase of Cloudflare’s market capitalisation from 5 billion dollars in 
2019 to 23 billion dollars in 2020 gives an indication of the growing relevance of this 
form of “risk processing.” According to a 2019 forecast, the global market for DDoS 
protection and mitigation is expected to almost double from 2.4 billion in 2019 to 4.7 
billion in 2024.69 
DDoS protection services rely on a combination of different techniques for 
identifying and filtering out malicious traffic. This is increasingly done as a service 
and on the network level, which implies that the owner of a website agrees to route 
all incoming traffic through the servers of the protection provider. There, the traffic 
is analysed in order to identify patterns that can be linked to known attacks, 
sometimes also involving assessments of individual IP addresses’ reputation. Scale is a 
significant aspect in this regard, since the performance of filtering mechanisms can 
be improved by analysing large amounts of attack data, especially when these 
mechanisms are based on Machine Learning. But scale is also an advantage when it 
comes to the size of the provider’s network. For example, the Content Delivery 
Networks of Akamai and Cloudflare play an increasingly central role for the 
distribution of large files across the web, e.g., for streaming services, by means of 
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redundant local storing and dedicated private networks.70 However, their bandwidth 
capacities, along with high flexibility when it comes to traffic management, also 
provides effective measures against DDoS attacks.71 
The commercial offerings of these protection providers are out of reach for 
under-resourced NGOs. They therefore rely on free versions of protection services, 
sometimes involving limits on the volume of attack traffic that is processed. 
Cloudflare has gained a dominant position in this field by offering free basic DDoS 
protection services without volume limitations. There are also more comprehensive 
free protection programmes specifically geared towards human rights organisations 
and journalistic outlets, such as Google’s “Project Shield”72 and Cloudflare’s “Project 
Galileo.”73 Similar advanced protection programmes for independent media 
organisations and NGOs are offered by non-commercial providers such as eQualitie74 
and Qurium.75 
Even if NGOs, thus, have a number of options to choose from, they have, 
structurally speaking, become dependent on the free DDoS protection services 
provided by the above companies and organisations. The fact that the market for 
DDoS protection is dominated by few actors and that scale favours the largest ones, 
raises concerns about growing market concentration in this area. 
 
The politics of infrastructuring 
The discussion above points towards a different relationship between breakdown and 
visibility than is usually envisaged in infrastructure studies. Rather than holding a 
potential for increased visibility, DDoS attacks have – by shifting from exceptional 
events to perpetual crisis – contributed to the establishment of new intermediaries in 
the form of DDoS protection providers. As an ever-larger part of internet traffic is 
being routed through the networks of these intermediaries, it is affected by centrally 
implemented decision mechanisms that remain opaque to the average user. 
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 This development clearly diverges from earlier incarnations of internet 
infrastructure that spawned hopes of self-organisation76 and “fringe intelligence.”77 
These hopes were especially tied to the end-to-end principle, where routing and 
control functions are performed by adaptive decision mechanisms at the edges of the 
network, whereas the core merely transmits according to basic rules.78 Even if 
historical investigations point toward the need to nuance this picture,79 there is an 
observable shift in how traffic is being processed and analysed. Rather than the 
“nonsynchronous optimization” of the earlier internet that “prefers to leave the 
optimal unsettled,”80 the current situation is, according to McKelvey, characterised by 
“polychronous optimization”81 that is technically administered by “intermediary 
daemons.” Ever more fine-grained information about what kinds of traffic are being 
transported supplies these intermediaries with criteria for “micro-decisions”82 about 
the routing of data: “The unsettled metastability of the internet is replaced by a 
regulated system of service guarantees and data limits. The diagram shifts from the 
edges to the core, with infrastructures progressively taking on greater management 
capacities.”83  
The growing reliance on DDoS protection services is, thus, part of a general 
development towards traffic management mechanisms that remain opaque to users – 
and, as such, a new kind of infrastructural invisibility. Taking the long-term 
consequences of DDoS attacks into consideration, therefore, provides a more 
comprehensive picture of the power relations emerging from the use of such attacks. 
This suggests that, when discussing the legitimacy and effectivity of DDoS, it does not 
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suffice to focus on particular political constellations; rather, there is a need to also 
reflect upon their impact on an infrastructural level. 
What this change of perspective implies is to pay closer attention to the 
different kinds of temporality involved in DDoS attacks, including a reassessment of 
established notions of breakdown and visibility. The maintenance approach in 
infrastructure studies can be seen as one step in this direction. Contrasting an 
emphasis on the eventfulness of large-scale ruptures with a more process-oriented 
focus on decay and repair helps to recognise different modes of temporality involved 
in communication breakdown. Yet, the protection provided by services such as 
Cloudflare hardly fit the description of small-scale and ad-hoc maintenance. The 
traffic management performed by these providers is rather systematic, centralised and 
globally coordinated. Therefore, following Holt, such intermediaries cannot merely 
be considered “connecting agents or messy middlemen – they are in many cases key 
infrastructures and primary agents of power.”84 
DDoS protection represents an emerging kind of infrastructure that does not 
become visible upon breakdown, but rather thrives on it. A promising approach to 
explore this relationship could be to abandon visuality as a guiding metaphor. As 
Carmi convincingly argues, sound and listening metaphors are a more apt choice 
when seeking to theorise persistent forms of communication crises, especially those 
re-appearing in certain patterns or rhythms. According to her, reoccurring patterns 
of “media distortions” engender forms of “processed listening” that seek to measure, 
categorise and filter “deviant” behaviour: 
when specific bodies, behaviors and rhythms interfere with media 
companies’ business model(s), they illegitimize them and filter, 
remove, delete, and reduce them. They become noise, disturbance, 
deviant, and spam.85 
While Carmi does mention DDoS attacks in passing, an elaborated account of DDoS 
protection as a form of “processed listening” remains a desiderate. Thinking of these 
intermediaries as forms of listening would help to refocus attention to forms of 
temporality other than the event – the progressive weaving of measurement 
capabilities into the infrastructure of the internet, the continuous adaptation of 
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filtering rules to recurring patterns identified in traffic analysis and the gradual 
persuasion of website owners to become accustomed to their reliance on protection. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has focused on crises of communication caused by current forms of DDoS 
attacks and has highlighted the need to reflect upon the different temporal 
dimensions of such attacks. In a more immediate sense, a successful DDoS attack 
disrupts the exchange of data between clients and servers, thus rendering content 
inaccessible. Depending on the political constellations involved, this can have a 
revealing impetus, in the sense that it focuses attention on specific political questions. 
It can also create a sense of technicity, i.e. bringing the openness and negotiability of 
technical constellations to the fore. However, when these kinds of breakdown become 
ordinary, they rather appear as detrimental to visibility, elevating protection 
providers into an intermediary position where they decide about the accessibility of 
content, thus introducing opaque mechanisms of traffic management. 
Acknowledging these long-term effects of DDoS attacks allows for a more 
comprehensive understanding of their role, both in terms of hacktivist tactics and in 
terms of infrastructural developments. Hacktivism research that focuses on DDoS as 
a political tactic seems preoccupied with the immediate political impact of specific 
attacks. This comes at the expense of their more systemic infrastructural 
consequences. Integrating further temporal perspectives could help to better 
understand the interrelationship between specific, situated attacks and the broader 
economic and technological structures that they bring about. Broadening the horizon 
in this way seems especially important when discussing the legitimacy of DDoS 
attacks. To put it bluntly: How relevant is the immediately perceivable effect of 
current DDoS attacks compared to the behind-the-scenes infrastructural adjustments 
that they trigger? Depending on the (empirical) answer to this question, many 
arguments that have been brought forward in favour of DDoS as a political tactic 
might have to be re-evaluated. 
On a more abstract level, the paper has highlighted the need to reflect upon 
different forms of temporality when theorising the relationship between breakdown 
and infrastructure. As a kind of communication crisis, DDoS points to the fact that 
certain kinds of persistent breakdown render infrastructure opaque, rather than 
allowing revealing insights. Focusing on the way that repetitive patterns of 
interference contribute to long-term infrastructural transformations holds the 
potential of broadening analyses of power relations in current media environments. 
Programmatically speaking, it is also a call to explore a greater variety of temporal 
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relationships between crises of communication and infrastructures of 
communication. 
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